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The previous two chapters have explored the psychological, social and 
 demographic factors that are linked to youth civic and political engagement. 
By contrast, the present chapter focuses on macro factors. By macro factors, 
we mean the large-scale factors that together define the broader societal and 
institutional context within which an individual lives. These factors include 
historical, cultural, economic, political, legal, policy and technological factors.
This chapter examines a wide range of macro factors including: the broad pat-
terns of political and civic engagement that occur among adults within a coun-
try; the historical, cultural, economic, institutional and legal characteristics of a 
country; public policies on young people’s active citizenship; the legally specified 
minimum age for voting; the provision of youth organisations; the availability of 
a youth parliament within a country; the education policies and regulations that 
determine the quality of the formal education that young people receive within 
a country; the role that digital technology, the Internet and social media play in 
youth civic and political engagement; and youth mobilisation by politicians and 
political parties.
The relevance of adults’ civic and political engagement 
to young people’s civic and political engagement
Adults’ patterns of civic and political engagement within a country are important 
for understanding patterns of youth engagement because the patterns of engage-
ment that are displayed by adults are typically mirrored in the patterns displayed 
by young people living within the same country. This finding emerged clearly 
from a study by Sloam (2016). Analysing the patterns of political participation 
exhibited by 15- to 24-year-olds in 15 European countries, he found wide-
spread differences in these patterns from one country to another. Interestingly, 
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however, the rate of participation among youth was proportional to the rate 
of participation among adults living within the same country. Thus, the three 
countries with the highest rate of voting among adults (Belgium, Denmark and 
Sweden) were also the three countries that had the highest rates of youth vot-
ing, while those countries with the lowest rates of voting among adults also had 
the lowest rates of youth voting (Luxembourg, Ireland and the UK). Exactly the 
same applied to the other forms of participation that were examined (displaying 
a badge or sticker, signing petitions, joining boycotts and participating in a dem-
onstration) – the extent to which youth engaged in each individual practice was 
proportional to the extent to which adults living in the same country engaged 
in that practice. In short, youth political and civic engagement was directly pro-
portional to the broader political-civic participatory culture among adults in 
the country where they lived. This finding is not surprising, given that adult 
behaviour often functions as a powerful role model for young people, particu-
larly in relationship to their prosocial and civic behaviour (Eisenberg, Spinrad & 
Knafo-Noam, 2015).
It is also noteworthy that the political-civic participatory culture of adults 
within a country is itself systematically related to a wide range of macro factors. 
Thus, the participatory culture of adults may well mediate the effects of macro 
factors on youth civic and political engagement. There are numerous macro 
factors that have been found to be systematically linked to adults’ patterns of 
participation, including characteristics of the electoral, political and legal institu-
tions that are used to govern the country, the level of economic development of 
the country and the recent political history of the country.
For example, the likelihood of adults turning out to vote in elections is related 
to various characteristics of the electoral system (Geys, 2006). More adults are 
likely to vote when:
 • A proportional representation system is used rather than a first-past-the-post 
system
 • Voter registration processes are simple rather than cumbersome
 • When voting takes place on a rest day rather than a working day
 • Voting is compulsory rather than optional
Voter turnout in elections is also related to certain broad characteristics of a 
country’s population. Turnout is higher when the electorate is small, the popu-
lation is stable (in terms of the length of time that individuals have resided in 
specific locations) and the ethnic minority share of the total population is small 
(Geys, 2006).
In addition, the structure of political institutions within a country shapes the 
particular forms of non-electoral political participation that are used by adults. 
For example, in countries where political institutions provide many oppor-
tunities for citizens and civil society organisations to influence policy (e.g., 
Switzerland), there are high levels of moderate forms of action such as signing 
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petitions and participating in campaigns. By contrast, in countries where there 
are relatively few such opportunities (e.g., France), there are high levels of more 
extreme forms of action such as demonstrations and strikes (Kriesi, Koopmans, 
Duyvendak & Giugni, 1995). Likewise, it has been found that adults are more 
likely to engage in non-conventional political and civic participation in countries 
that have decentralised political, administrative and fiscal systems (Vráblíková, 
2014; Vráblíková & Císař, 2015).
That said, PIDOP found that all forms of participation (apart from voting) are 
higher among adults in countries in which there is a high level of government 
accountability. In other words, participation is higher in countries where the 
government is held to account for its actions by a free press and at periodic elec-
tions, financial contributions to political parties are openly disclosed, freedom 
of the press is guaranteed and corruption is controlled (Brunton-Smith, 2011; 
Brunton-Smith & Barrett, 2015).
PIDOP also discovered that the forms of participation used by adults are 
related to the human rights and legal institutions of the country in which they 
are living. Three features are especially important here: rule of law (i.e., the 
presence of an independent judiciary, impartial courts and legal protection for 
minorities), human rights record (i.e., women’s rights, minority rights and legal 
prohibitions on the use of torture) and civil liberties (i.e., freedom of expression 
and protest, freedom to form professional organisations and trade unions, and 
religious tolerance). Adults are more likely to participate using civic and conven-
tional political means in countries that are high on the rule of law and on their 
human rights record; however, they are more likely to participate using non-
conventional means in countries that are high on civil liberties (Brunton-Smith, 
2011; Brunton-Smith & Barrett, 2015).
In addition, PIDOP confirmed that the economy of a country is a further 
relevant macro factor: all forms of participation other than voting are higher in 
countries that have a well-performing economy. In other words, participation 
is higher in countries where GDP growth and GDP per capita are high, gross 
domestic savings as a proportion of GDP are high, foreign direct investment is 
high, unemployment is low and effective tax collection takes place (Brunton-
Smith, 2011; Brunton-Smith & Barrett, 2015).
Adults’ patterns of political and civic participation are also linked to the recent 
history of the country in which they live. For example, in the 1990s, adults living 
in the former communist countries of Eastern Europe had lower levels of partici-
pation than those living in Western European countries that had a longstanding 
history of democracy. This gap widened further between 1990 and 1999, with the 
proportion of people who took part in non-conventional forms of participation in 
Western Europe rising by 7% while the proportion in Eastern Europe fell by 9%. 
However, participation levels remained high during this period in those particu-
lar Eastern European countries where collective popular action had contributed 
to bringing down the communist regime (Czechoslovakia, East Germany and 
Poland); participation only declined in those countries where the transition from 
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communism had been driven by political elites (Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovenia) (Bernhagen & Marsh, 2007).
Finally, the cultural characteristics of countries are also linked to adults’ pat-
terns of political and civic participation. For example, in countries that have 
predominantly Catholic traditions, women have lower levels of political interest, 
political knowledge and political participation compared to women in coun-
tries that have predominantly Protestant traditions (Galligan, 2012; Inglehart & 
Norris, 2003). The availability of associations, organisations and social networks 
within a country is also related to higher levels of participation among adults 
(Putnam, 2000). Associations and organisations are important because they pro-
vide contexts in which individuals acquire the skills that are needed for political 
participation and provide individuals with opportunities to engage in political 
discussions and to become civically and politically active.
In short, adults’ patterns of civic and political participation are systematically 
related to a wide range of macro factors, including: characteristics of the electoral 
system; the structure of political institutions; government accountability; the 
country’s record on rule of law, human rights and civil liberties; the country’s 
level of economic development; the recent political history of the country; and 
the cultural characteristics of the country. Insofar as adults’ patterns of participa-
tion are mirrored in patterns of youth participation (Sloam, 2016), the latter are 
similarly related to these various macro factors.
Direct evidence of the relationship between 
macro factors and youth engagement
Additional, more direct, evidence on the relationship between macro factors and 
youth engagement was obtained in CIVED (Torney-Purta et al., 2001), ICCS 
2009 (Schulz et al., 2010) and ICCS 2016 (Schulz et al., 2017). All of these stud-
ies also found significant cross-national differences in 14-year-olds’ political and 
civic knowledge, attitudes and engagement. These differences were not random 
but were systematically related to particular characteristics of the countries in 
which these teenagers were living.
For example, CIVED found differences in levels of trust in political and legal 
institutions among the 14-year-olds according to whether their country had 
more or less than 40 years of continuous democracy: higher levels of trust were 
found among those who lived in countries with longstanding democratic tradi-
tions. However, the importance which they attributed to conventional citizen-
ship practices such as voting and joining a political party tended to be lower in 
countries in which there were longstanding democratic traditions, and higher in 
countries in which conventional political institutions and forms of participation 
had been strengthened in the previous 30 years (Torney-Purta et al., 2001).
CIVED also uncovered significant differences in levels of political knowledge 
across countries. Youngsters living in ten countries (including Finland, Hong 
Kong and the United States) had scores that were significantly higher than the 
80 Macro contextual factors 
international average, while those living in eight countries (including Romania, 
Chile and Colombia) had scores that were significantly lower than the interna-
tional average. The levels of political knowledge among the 14-year-olds were 
significantly correlated with the levels of economic development (indexed in 
terms of gross national product per capita) of the country in which they lived 
(Torney-Purta et al., 2001).
Likewise, both ICCS 2009 and ICCS 2016 found differences in 14-year-olds’ 
political knowledge across countries. In both cases, these differences were sig-
nificantly associated with their country’s score on the United Nations Human 
Development Index (HDI). The HDI is a composite index that captures the 
extent to which the people living within a given country have long and healthy 
lives, are knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living – in other words, 
the HDI reflects the level of health, educational and economic development of a 
country. Both ICCS studies found a strong positive association between the level 
of political knowledge among 14-year-olds and the HDI of the country in which 
they lived (Schulz et al., 2010; Schulz et al., 2017).
Further evidence concerning the relationship between macro factors and 
patterns of civic and political engagement among youth comes from PIDOP 
(Brunton-Smith, 2011; Brunton-Smith & Barrett, 2015). As noted already, these 
analyses revealed that, among adults, all forms of participation other than voting 
are higher in countries that score well on economic performance, government 
accountability, rule of law and human rights. Exactly the same relationships 
between levels of participation and these four macro factors were also found 
among 15- to 24-year-old youth. In other words, these relationships were pre-
sent irrespective of age – not only adults but also youth displayed these relation-
ships, consistent with the findings of Sloam (2016).
Explaining the influence of macro factors on  
youth engagement
The causal relationships through which many of these macro factors impact on 
youth engagement are almost certainly indirect and mediated by demographic 
and social factors (see Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1). For example, the economic 
characteristics of a country are most likely to impact on youth engagement in 
two main ways. First, they are likely to influence the socio-economic situation 
of youth and hence their ability to acquire the material resources and the civic 
skills that are required for political activity (Brady et al., 1995). Second, they are 
likely to impact on national expenditure on educational provision (IES, 2015), 
with the quality of that provision being the more immediate proximal social 
factor that affects young people’s experiences at school (education being a signifi-
cant source of influence on young people’s civic and political engagement – see 
Chapter 3).
Social mediators are presumably also responsible for the effects of historical, 
cultural and political macro factors on youth engagement. Indeed, it seems highly 
 Macro contextual factors 81
likely that it is adults in youths’ social environments, especially their parents and 
teachers, who are the critical mediators between macro factors and youth civic 
and political engagement. This is because macro factors provide the background 
against which parents and teachers position themselves ideologically, politically 
and socially. Their positioning will influence their beliefs, attitudes, values, dis-
courses and practices. Youth are then exposed to the discourses and practices of 
these individuals (rather than to the macro factors per se), with it being these 
more proximal discourses and practices in their immediate social environment 
that actually influence their patterns of engagement and participation. In short, 
it is likely that very few macro factors operate independently of social and demo-
graphic factors. Instead, it is much more likely that macro, demographic and 
social factors are intertwined in complex causal pathways. These pathways have 
not been investigated in any great depth to date. This is a task which research in 
the future will need to tackle.
National policies on migrant integration and naturalisation
In the case of youth who migrate to another country either on their own or with 
their families, a major constraint on, or facilitator of, their political participation 
is the set of legal, institutional and educational arrangements for migrants that 
are in place in the country to which they have migrated. These arrangements 
vary considerably from one country to another. They can also vary within indi-
vidual countries according to migrants’ national or ethnic origins (e.g., depend-
ing on whether there are former colonial links to their country of origin). Some 
countries also allow naturalisation based on the individual having lived within 
the country of residence for a certain number of years, being descended from a 
citizen of the country, or being married to a citizen of the country. The extent 
to which a country facilitates or impedes migrants’ access to naturalisation, 
grants or denies voting rights to migrants, ensures or blocks the representation of 
migrants’ interests in the political system, and establishes or fails to establish for-
mal consultative bodies through which migrant communities can communicate 
their views to local and national government can all have a significant impact 
on migrants’ political engagement (Ireland, 1994; Martiniello, 2005; Penninx, 
Martiniello & Vertovec, 2004). The legal rules for naturalisation are especially 
important insofar as acquiring the citizenship of the country bestows full voting 
rights on those who are above the legal minimum voting age.
Of course, whether or not immigrants and their offspring actually take up 
the opportunities for participation that are provided by the institutional frame-
work depends on a wide range of factors. These include, for example, their own 
political values, interest and attitudes; their knowledge of the country’s political 
system; their levels of previous political engagement in their country of origin; 
whether or not they perceive their presence in their country of residence as being 
permanent; their sense of belonging to the country of residence; and the avail-
ability of migrant associations and organisations within the country of residence 
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(Martiniello, 2005). Importantly, there are many opportunities for participation 
available to migrant youth beyond electoral participation. For example, migrant 
youth who are not naturalised can nevertheless still participate legally in both 
civic and political actions – they can participate through community organi-
sations, trade unions and pressure groups such as anti-racist, human rights or 
environmental organisations. They can also engage in a wide variety of civic and 
non-conventional political actions, including consumer activism, fund-raising 
and charitable activity, writing letters to politicians and public officials, signing 
petitions and participating in political demonstrations.
Further macro factors that can facilitate or hinder the civic and political 
engagement of migrant youth stem from the education system into which these 
youth are enrolled in their new country of residence. Various structural features 
of the education system may lead to low educational achievement by migrant 
students, which, as we saw in Chapter 3, can have significant consequences for 
their civic and political engagement. For example, educational systems that sort 
students into different ability tracks at an early age often lead to lower educa-
tional achievement by migrant students; achievement among migrants tends to 
be higher in comprehensive education systems which operate a late selection of 
students into different ability tracks (NESSE, 2008). In addition, migrant stu-
dents benefit if their schools offer support for their language needs when their 
mother tongue is not the official language of instruction. The amount of time 
that schools devote to teaching immigrant pupils the language of instruction 
varies substantially across countries. For example, in one European survey, it was 
found that the figure ranged from two to 14 hours per week depending on the 
country (Eurydice, 2009). Hence, in countries where late selection and extensive 
linguistic tuition is available, the level of educational achievement by migrant 
students tends to be higher, and as a consequence the civic and political engage-
ment of those students is also likely to be higher.
However, it is not only young migrants attending school who can benefit 
from receiving instruction in the language of the host country. Migrants who 
are beyond school leaving age can also benefit from such instruction. Indeed, 
there are a large number of measures that can be taken to aid the integration of 
migrants into the country of residence and boost their civic and political partici-
pation (Council of Europe, 2016a). These include:
 • Giving migrants who have limited proficiency in the language of their 
country of residence access to language instruction
 • Providing integration programmes that focus on opening doors to the local 
community, so that migrants meet local organisations, services and mentors 
who are open to diversity and interested to support their integration
 • Requiring that staff who deliver migrant integration and language pro-
grammes work with volunteers from the local community and promote 
intercultural activities such as conversation tandems where migrants and 
non-migrants can learn about each other’s culture and way of life
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 • Creating grants to support migrant-run associations and support the setting 
up of mainstream civic and political organisations to mentor migrants
 • Recruiting residents of migrant background to local consultative bodies of 
all types
 • Granting the right to vote and stand in local and regional elections to 
migrants after a minimum period of legal residence (e.g., five years)
 • Granting an entitlement to citizenship for first-generation migrants after a 
minimum period of legal residence (e.g., ten years)
 • Granting an entitlement to citizenship for migrants’ children who have been 
educated or born in the country
In short, many different policies and institutional arrangements on migrant inte-
gration, naturalisation and the education of migrant youth can have significant 
effects on the civic and political activity of migrant youth. Depending on their 
configuration, these legal and institutional arrangements can either facilitate or 
hinder these youths’ civic and political engagement.
Youth policies
Youth policies also form an important part of the institutional macro context 
within which youth civic and political engagement occurs. These policies may 
be developed at different levels of governance, for example at local, regional 
or national level (and, in the case of European countries, at European level as 
well). Youth policies are important because they contribute to framing public 
debates and discussions about youth engagement. Policies that are formulated 
by national governments are especially important in this respect because they 
not only help to frame public discussion and debate but also delineate offi-
cial expectations of young people’s civic and political engagement and help to 
shape government spending priorities and the allocation of resources to support 
youth engagement, for example, through the provision of funding for youth 
organisations.
For this reason, PIDOP examined national governments’ policies on active 
citizenship and participation among youth in seven European countries: 
Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Turkey and the UK (Bee & 
Guerrina, 2014; Guerrina & Bee, 2012). Official government policy documents 
published between 2004 and 2009 were analysed to identify the government 
discourses that were used about youth engagement in these countries.
It was discovered that these documents contained several common empha-
ses across countries. For example, most national governments emphasised the 
importance of encouraging the active participation of young people and of 
strengthening tolerance, respect for diversity, democracy, justice and human 
rights. In addition, in the Czech Republic, Germany, Italy and Turkey, there 
was an emphasis on the need to enhance and promote intercultural dialogue 
among young people.
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However, some notable differences across countries were also found. For 
 example, the Portuguese policy documents drew attention to the need to empower 
youth organisations by encouraging and supporting their activities, to ensure the 
representation of youth organisations at the municipal level, and to promote the 
discussion of issues related to the aspirations and needs of young people. The need 
for youth councils and organisations to be accepted and included as equal partners 
in dialogue was also emphasised in Germany, while in the Czech Republic the 
need to contribute to the development of organisations that support the activi-
ties of young people was also identified as a key objective. However, a very 
different orientation was present in the UK policies, which instead focused on 
youth justice and social justice, the objective being to enhance the government’s 
understanding of the needs of young people who commit offences, so that these 
needs can be properly addressed, and to ensure that the voices of children and 
young people are able to shape and influence safeguarding policies and practices. 
Consistent with other UK government policies at that time, the UK documents 
also stressed the need for policies to support youth activities that help to enhance 
community cohesion and foster a sense of social solidarity at the local level. In 
Turkey, by contrast, the official documents that were analysed emphasised the 
role of social services as a tool for remedying social problems and enhancing life 
standards, the importance of improving protective and preventive measures in 
social services and the need to provide social services for those who are in need 
regardless of class, language, religion and region.
In a subsequent analysis, Bozkurt, Çok and Şener (2015) examined a more 
recent Turkish government document which contained the first comprehensive 
statement of policy strategies related to youth in Turkey – the National Youth and 
Sports Policy Document. This document was published by the Turkish Ministry of 
Youth and Sports in 2013. Bozkurt et al. found that, despite the existence of gov-
ernment discourse promoting youth participation in the document, there were also 
signs that the government viewed youth as a segment of the population that needed 
to be shaped, controlled and protected, rather than as active citizens who should 
be involved in the decision-making processes that affect themselves and society 
more generally. For example, there were references in this policy document to 
the vulnerability of youth, the need to protect youth from bad habits and the need 
to prevent youths’ alienation from national and moral values. Commenting on 
another document published in 2012 by the conservative ruling party, the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP), Bozkurt et al. note that the main mission ascribed 
to youth by the party in this document is to be virtuous and exemplary. Bozkurt et 
al. argue that there is a tension within the Turkish government’s view between, on 
the one hand, the engagement of youth in civic and political life (which encour-
ages civic activism among youth) and, on the other hand, the AKP’s avowal of 
conservative values (which discourages such activism). They argue that this tension 
erupted during the Gezi Park protests in Istanbul in 2013, when youth willingly 
took on the role of civic activists but in doing so were brutally attacked by the 
police under the control of the government.
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In another study of youth policies within an individual country, Villano and 
Bertocchi (2014) examined 32 Italian national and regional documents in order 
to identify their underlying assumptions. The Italian Ministry for Youth, which 
was established in 2008, is mandated to deal with, among other issues, the rights of 
young people to freedom of speech and forms of association, their needs and inter-
ests and their right to take part in public life. However, the delivery of this agenda 
is delegated to the regions of Italy. Examining the documents from the region of 
Emilia Romagna, Villano and Bertocchi note that the region places high value on 
the participation of youth in civil and social life, on the promotion of active citi-
zenship and on intergenerational, intercultural and inter-religious dialogue to sup-
port the cohesion and the growth of the community. This is coupled to practical 
support and funding for various forms of youth association aimed at youth activities 
as well as support for the involvement of young people in decision-making pro-
cesses by means of the practices of e-democracy. In short, at the official level, there 
are attempts to promote the civic and political participation of young people by 
supporting the creation and development of youth associations and organisations.
However, in addition to examining these policy documents, Villano and 
Bertocchi conducted interviews with politicians and representatives of non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) that promote projects for young people. 
The interviews revealed that, in practice, attention to the active participation of 
young people has not been very widespread to date, with there being many gaps 
in the implementation of the official policy agenda. It was noted that there were 
missed opportunities offered by the European Union to promote young people’s 
participation and also a widespread failure to take advantage of available funding 
opportunities. This has been accompanied by cuts to public funding for training 
and a failure to invest sufficiently in research, universities and schools, which has 
further exacerbated the problems in the implementation of the youth policies. In 
addition, the interviewees reported that many young people are much more ori-
entated towards non-conventional and indirect forms of participation rather than 
the traditional forms of conventional participation such as voting, which makes 
the encouragement of the latter much harder to achieve. In other words, what 
emerges from this study is a gap between what may be very well-intentioned 
policies and their actual implementation on the ground.
There can, of course, also be a further gap between the measures that are 
implemented and the perceptions of those measures and of government inten-
tions by those who are the intended recipients and beneficiaries of the policies. 
Unfortunately, there is a paucity of concrete research into these sorts of issues 
in this area. Future research will need to elucidate not only the causal links that 
exist between government policies and youth engagement but also the mediating 
role that young people’s perceptions of government policies are likely to play in 
the process. This is because, as we saw in Chapter 2, trust in government institu-
tions, perceived institutional effectiveness and the emotions that are linked to the 
perceived fairness of those institutions are important psychological factors that 
are related to youth engagement and participation.
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Voting age
One macro factor that obviously affects youth political participation is the legally 
specified minimum age of voting within the country in which young people 
live. The most common voting age around the world is 18 years, although some 
countries allow those aged 16 years and above to vote in national elections (e.g., 
Argentina, Austria and Brazil), while a few countries do not allow youth to vote 
in such elections until they are 21 years of age (e.g., Malaysia and Singapore). 
Even though the minimum age of voting in national elections may be 18 years, 
youth are sometimes allowed to vote from the age of 16 in certain types of elec-
tions (e.g., local or regional elections or referenda) in some countries. The extent 
to which young people actually vote once they have attained the minimum age 
for voting additionally depends on whether voting within the country is com-
pulsory or optional – voting rates are higher when it is compulsory (Geys, 2006).
In recent years, there have been efforts in a number of countries to reduce the 
voting age from 18 to 16 years. The most common argument made against mak-
ing such a change is that 16- and 17-year-olds lack sufficient political maturity in 
terms of their ability to consider the effects of their voting decisions on society, 
their country and themselves. This argument does not rule out the possibility 
that there may be some 16- and 17-year-olds who do possess the necessary level 
of political maturity; instead, it simply assumes that the likelihood of someone 
aged 18 years or older possessing political maturity is higher than the likelihood 
of someone aged 16 years possessing it, and that age 18 is a pragmatic cut-off 
point above which a sufficient proportion of citizens are likely to have the neces-
sary political maturity to be able to vote in a meaningful manner.
Chan and Clayton (2006) have usefully evaluated the evidence on the politi-
cal maturity of 16- and 17-year-olds. They define political maturity in terms of 
having an interest in politics, having knowledge of the political system, under-
standing the nature and significance of the issues that are the subject of public 
and political debate, possessing political convictions that are logically coherent 
and are not subject to whimsical revision, and appreciating the expected con-
sequences of the political choices that one makes. Reviewing a wide range of 
evidence collected in British surveys, they show that 16- and 17-year-olds are 
indeed less mature politically than older people: they are less interested in poli-
tics, less knowledgeable about political facts, their attitudes are less coherent and 
their attitudes are less stable over time. For this reason, Chan and Clayton rec-
ommend that the voting age should not be lowered from 18 to 16.
However, a problem with Chan and Clayton’s argument is that the data on 
16- and 17-year-olds which they analyse are drawn from individuals who, as we 
saw in Chapter 1, often have considerable interest in a wide range of both local 
and global issues but feel excluded from the political process because they do 
not have the vote and think that politicians do not have any serious interest in 
their point of view. They therefore reject the conventional political arena and 
turn instead to single issue causes and use non-conventional political and civic 
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forms of participation instead. In other words, it may be precisely because they 
feel excluded from the conventional political arena that they disengage from it 
and exhibit lower levels of political maturity in relationship to that arena. It is 
possible that granting voting rights to 16- and 17-year-olds may provide just the 
incentive that is required to encourage them to learn about conventional politics 
and to become more politically mature.
One way to test this argument is to examine data from countries in which the 
voting age has been reduced to 16 in order to see how this change has affected 
16- and 17-year-olds’ political interest and knowledge, and whether under these 
circumstances 16- and 17-year-olds’ electoral behaviour differs from that of older 
youth and adults. Such data have been collected in Austria, where the voting 
age was lowered from 18 to 16 for participation in national elections in 2007. 
Analyses of Austrian data by Zeglovits and Zandonella (2013) reveal that politi-
cal interest among 16- and 17-year-olds increased substantially between 2004 
and 2008, as did following political news; importantly, political interest in 2008 
was highest among those youth who talked to their teachers about politics and 
who engaged in citizenship activities at school, suggesting that citizenship edu-
cation in schools can play a significant role in developing the political maturity 
of new young voters.
Wagner, Johann and Kritzinger (2012) also analysed Austrian data which 
were collected in 2009. They found that interest in politics was equally high 
among 16- and 17-year-olds as among 22- to 25-year-olds, and that those aged 
under 18 were equally motivated to take part in political life as older age groups. 
Furthermore, these youngest voters’ trust in political institutions, and their satis-
faction with national and European democracy, were both high, and these youth 
did not differ from those aged 18 and over in the extent to which they recog-
nised that the national parliament had an important impact on them personally. 
Finally, Wagner et al. conducted a number of analyses to investigate whether the 
precise voting choices that were made by 16- and 17-year-olds and the quality 
of their decision-making were in any way less good than the decision-making 
of those aged over 18. They found very few differences between these younger 
voters and older voters. They conclude that 16- and 17-year-olds are both able 
and willing to participate effectively in politics, and that their voting choices are 
of no lesser quality than those of individuals aged 18 or older.
It is therefore plausible that, in countries where the voting age remains at 18, 
many 16- and 17-year-olds lack political maturity primarily because they are not 
permitted to vote and because they believe that politicians lack serious inter-
est in their views. In addition, it is noteworthy that, given that many 16- and 
17-year-olds are still in full-time education, if these youth were to be allowed 
to vote, they would be able to receive educational support for their political 
decision-making (e.g., by being encouraged to conduct research into political 
issues; to explore those issues from a range of different perspectives; to compare 
and contrast different perspectives; to engage in critical evaluations of perspec-
tives, information and the sources from which information has been derived; 
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to think logically and coherently about political issues; and to draw reasoned 
conclusions). The available evidence is consistent with the view that, under such 
conditions, high levels of political interest would be generated, which could then 
have substantial benefits for the future political participation of the individuals 
concerned insofar as voting is known to be habit-forming, with individuals who 
have voted in the past being more likely to continue voting in the future (Geys, 
2006). Allowing 16- and 17-year-olds to vote has the additional benefit of ena-
bling them to seek political representation on matters that can deeply affect their 
lives. This will not only reinforce their levels of political internal efficacy but 
will also have an effect on the candidates who are elected, their political priori-
ties and the extent to which the policies that they put forward take into account 
the concerns and views of youth.
The provision of youth organisations
As we saw in Chapter 3, another route that can be used to promote youth civic 
and political engagement is through the provision of youth organisations. Youth 
organisations can offer young people a wide range of opportunities to develop 
their civic and political skills and to become involved with civic and political 
issues. They help young people to encounter and explore new ways of perceiving 
social and political issues, to develop communication, public speaking and debat-
ing skills, to participate in group decision-making and to take on leadership, 
organisational and representative roles. The availability of youth organisations 
in a particular locale is therefore an important factor that can impact on youth 
engagement and participation within that locale.
A survey of youth organisations in Europe by the European Youth Forum 
(2016) revealed that these organisations are often founded on a common vision of 
building a just and fair society. Their missions frequently focus on the empower-
ment of youth, the mobilisation of youth to contribute to the building of more 
just and inclusive societies, the encouragement of youth to become autonomous 
active citizens and the enhancement of young people’s participation in decision-
making processes and democratic structures. It was found that a common general 
aim is to make young people agents of change in their own communities – key 
words that often appear in the strategic plans of youth organisations are ‘partici-
pation’, ‘engagement’, ‘empowerment’ and ‘change’.
Many youth organisations therefore aim explicitly to function as incuba-
tors for active citizenship. In pursuing this goal, they provide not only the 
space for raising awareness of civic and political issues and for discussing these 
issues, but also the structures and opportunities that may be needed to trans-
late young people’s views and ideas into practice. Furthermore, because many 
youth organisations are youth-led, they often have their own internal par-
ticipatory and decision-making processes, which means that democracy and 
participation can be intrinsic to their culture (European Youth Forum, 2016). 
In other words, by participating in these organisations, young people engage in 
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activities and actions that enable them to experience the principles and practice 
of democracy first hand.
Of course, youth organisations provide a very wide range of different pro-
grammes, projects and activities, the nature of which are determined by each 
organisation’s own particular mandate, the context within which it operates, 
and the particular membership group to which it is dedicated. They also vary in 
terms of how effective they are in boosting youth civic and political engagement 
(see Chapter 3 for a review). However, an advantage of youth organisations over 
schools and universities as incubators of citizenship is that they can reach out to 
all youth, including disadvantaged youth and those alienated from school, early 
school leavers and educational dropouts, as well as young people who are not in 
employment, education or training.
Unfortunately, however, youth organisations are not always available to young 
people. Their presence within a locale is often crucially dependent on local, 
regional or national government funding to support their operation (which in 
turn links back to public youth policies). If public funding is not available, these 
organisations can operate only through the good will of dedicated volunteers, 
through religious or other private associations or through private donations. In 
locations where there is a paucity of youth facilities and organisations, young 
people can experience a sense of frustration, feel a lack of power in their own 
communities and express antipathy towards local authorities. It is noteworthy 
that, when Weller (2007) asked a group of alienated 13- to 16-year-old English 
teenagers what they would like to change about where they lived, most called for 
more facilities such as youth clubs and for ‘more say over what happens’. If public 
authorities genuinely wish to equip young people with a sense of civic purpose 
and community involvement, then one of the most effective actions they can 
take to bring about these outcomes is to support the provision of suitable youth 
organisations through targeted funding.
Youth parliaments
Another action that public authorities can take to support and encourage young 
people’s engagement with politics is to operate a youth parliament. A survey of 
128 countries conducted by the Inter-Parliamentary Union in 2016 revealed that 
youth parliaments exist in about half of the countries that were surveyed. The 
structure and mode of operation of these parliaments vary considerably from one 
country to another. Some but not all youth parliaments have a formal relation-
ship to the national parliament, and in some cases the national parliament build-
ing is also used for meetings, with parliamentarians and parliamentary staff being 
involved in their operation. The majority of youth parliaments involve teenagers, 
although a few involve children aged 7 or 8 years upwards, while others involve 
youth from the voting age of 16 or 18 years up to the age of 30 or 35 years. Youth 
parliaments vary in terms of how their participants are selected. Sometimes 
school-based elections take place; in other cases, there is an application process; 
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occasionally, there are open public elections or public-speaking competitions. 
The frequency with which youth parliaments meet also varies across countries. 
Some meet only once per year, following a period in which the participants are 
prepared for the meeting either by their schools or by youth organisations; oth-
ers meet more frequently, sometimes every two months. Meetings may be either 
plenary-based or committee-based. Length of tenure in office lasts anywhere 
between one day and two years (Shephard & Patrikos, 2013).
Youth parliaments usually have several objectives (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 
2016). First, they typically aim to give young people the chance to express their 
views to those in power and to contribute to the youth agenda in the devel-
opment of public policies. Allied to this, some youth parliaments try to cre-
ate ongoing links between youth and government and parliamentary officials. 
Second, youth parliaments aim to empower young people politically by arous-
ing their interest in public affairs, equipping them with debating and leadership 
skills and providing them with personal experience of participatory democracy. 
Third, youth parliaments commonly seek to raise awareness of political and par-
liamentary processes among youth by giving them an understanding of how, for 
example, bills are drafted, laws are passed through parliament, and the various 
ways in which members of parliament conduct constituency work and liaise and 
interact with the media.
While all of these aims are eminently praiseworthy, youth parliaments have 
been criticised on a number of counts. First, there is the common criticism that 
there is little direct evidence of any meaningful impact of youth parliaments 
on government policy (although a few notable exceptions do exist, such as the 
Scottish Youth Parliament). At best, it has been suggested, most youth parlia-
ments have a more general indirect effect of keeping particular issues or points 
of view in the political arena (Shephard & Patrikos, 2013). For this reason, it has 
been argued that, as a minimum requirement, governments should be formally 
obliged to issue responses explaining why they support or oppose proposals that 
have been made by the youth parliament so that youth can feel that their views are 
being taken seriously and are being considered by those in power (Kyranakis & 
Nurvala, 2013).
Second, it is often officially maintained that involvement in youth parlia-
ments enhances young people’s public speaking, debating, collaborative, leader-
ship and organisational skills, and increases their levels of political engagement. 
However, there is a notable lack of research into the effects of youth parliaments 
on young people and therefore very little research evidence to support these 
claims. Indeed, it actually seems much more plausible that it is youth who already 
possess these kinds of skills, and who are already politically engaged, who are the 
most likely to become members of youth parliaments in the first place. That said, 
the skills and knowledge of these individuals are likely to be further enhanced as 
a consequence of the experience that they acquire through the youth parliament. 
Indeed, in a rare study into the effects of participation in a youth parliament (in 
Brazil), Fuks and Avila Casalecchi (2012) found that the participants, who were 
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high school students, showed a substantial increase in trust and confidence in the 
State Assembly as a consequence of their participation in the youth parliament, 
and that this increase was associated with the acquisition of knowledge about the 
Assembly. More research into the effects of youth parliaments on their partici-
pants is needed.
Third, it has been argued that youth parliaments favour select groups of 
youth, in particular those who are from more affluent backgrounds, those who 
happen to attend particular schools or youth organisations, and those who have 
a particular interest in politics (Wall & Dar, 2011). And indeed, young people 
from vulnerable or marginalised groups, such as ethnic minority youth, disabled 
youth, youth in care and homeless youth, tend not to be involved in youth par-
liaments (Turkie, 2010). Barriers to participation in a youth parliament include: 
the informal requirement for youth to be highly motivated, articulate and ambi-
tious in order to become a member of a youth parliament; the cost in terms of 
time, effort and financial resources to reach out to marginalised youth in order 
to draw them into a youth parliament; and the perception that quotas that could 
be used in principle to ensure the involvement of marginalised youth are usually 
unworkable, tokenistic or patronising in practice (Turkie, 2010).
Despite these reservations, it is nevertheless the case that the availability of 
a youth parliament within a country does at least provide a further additional 
channel through which youth can be engaged with political and policy processes. 
That said, if such an institution is to command broad respect among youth in 
general, rather than only among a relatively small number of advantaged youth, 
then the processes used to recruit youth to the parliament need to be sufficiently 
robust so that it is not exclusive to those who are socio-economically and edu-
cationally privileged. In addition, the formal link between the youth parliament 
and the national parliament and policymakers needs to be sufficiently strong 
to ensure that the youth parliament is not perceived by young people as being 
politically powerless and irrelevant.
Education policies and regulations on citizenship education
As we saw in Chapter 3, both the citizenship education courses which young 
people receive at school and the educational practices that are used by teachers 
in schools can have a significant impact on their civic and political engage-
ment. In particular, engagement is enhanced when schools provide citizenship 
education courses that require students to pay attention to national issues, gov-
ernment and politics, and to think about political issues in relationship to con-
temporary events, and when schools provide training in civic skills. Further 
enhancement of their engagement occurs when schools have an open classroom 
climate, operate student councils or parliaments and provide high-quality ser-
vice learning for students.
A critical issue here is the particular type of citizen that citizenship educa-
tion should aim to foster. Should it produce citizens who are knowledgeable 
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about current political institutions and processes, who use official political pro-
cesses and who feel an obligation to participate through these means? Or should 
it produce citizens who engage in critical reflection, direct participation and 
community-based action and who utilise interactive information technology to 
learn and to exchange views about civic and political issues? The former has 
been called dutiful or duty-based citizenship, while the latter has been called 
engaged or actualising citizenship (Bennett, 2007; Dalton, 2008). The key ques-
tion is whether citizenship education should aim to promote just one of these 
two types of citizen, or whether both forms should be promoted, which is argu-
ably the ideal.
Whether or not optimal curricula, pedagogies and school practices are in 
place to foster this ideal form of citizenship depends to a large extent on the 
education policies, regulations and recommendations that are provided by the 
relevant educational authorities (whether these be at the national, regional or 
local level) and on the provision of suitable levels of funding and resources for 
implementing those policies, regulations and recommendations. Two aspects of 
the education system are particularly important in this respect: policies and regu-
lations to ensure that an appropriate and effective citizenship education curricu-
lum is provided by schools, and the provision of suitable teacher education and 
training to ensure that teachers are competent in the practices and pedagogies 
that need to be applied for delivering high-quality citizenship education.
In order to examine these issues, Eurydice (2017) conducted a review of 
national policies on citizenship education across Europe. The review covered 
37 countries in total, including the 28 members of the European Union as well as 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Montenegro, Norway, Serbia, Switzerland and Turkey. Because 
some countries have more than a single education system (e.g., Belgium and the 
UK), the review focused its attention on the formal requirements for citizenship 
education as it is delivered in public sector schools in 42 education systems.
The review revealed that all 42 systems had curricula in place which were 
aimed at developing the abilities of students to interact effectively and con-
structively with others, to act in a socially responsible manner, to act dem-
ocratically and to think critically. Students’ interpersonal interactions were 
usually targeted at primary school level, critical thinking at lower second-
ary level, and learning how to act democratically at upper secondary level. 
Three main approaches were used for implementing citizenship education in 
the curriculum: as a separate school subject, integrated into a broader learn-
ing area such as the social sciences, or as a cross-curricular theme for delivery 
by all teachers. Most systems used either the integrated or cross-curricular 
approach (and both were frequently used together), meaning that a substantial 
proportion of teachers were expected to be involved in citizenship education. 
Citizenship education was less often implemented as a compulsory separate 
subject; in those systems where this approach was adopted, it tended to be used 
at secondary rather than primary school level.
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Almost all education systems had recommendations in place for schools to 
operate student councils at secondary level. However, there were significantly 
fewer recommendations on organising participation through student councils 
at primary level. Very few education systems provided recommendations on 
encouraging students to interact with political authorities. Twenty-nine edu-
cation systems provided recommendations on the provision of extra-curricular 
opportunities to support citizenship education, but these recommendations were 
made most frequently in relationship to lower and upper secondary education 
rather than primary education. The most common recommendations on extra-
curricular activities that were made were for environmental activities, followed 
closely by activities to raise awareness of political life, while recommendations on 
providing opportunities for voluntary work were the least common (particularly 
at primary and at lower secondary levels).
Regulations and recommendations on assessment in citizenship education 
were a further problem identified by the Eurydice review. While many educa-
tion systems provided teachers with official guidelines on classroom assessment 
in citizenship education for the purposes of teaching and learning, national 
tests aimed at summarising students’ achievements at the end of a period of 
learning (for the purpose of either awarding certificates or making decisions 
about student progression) were only available in 17 out of the 42 education 
systems. Furthermore, only eight used summative assessment for evaluating the 
effectiveness of schools and of the education system in achieving the intended 
learning outcomes. Given the fact that teachers commonly ‘teach to the test’, 
that is, focus their teaching on what is going to be assessed at the end of a 
course of study (Black, 1998; Spratt, 2005; Stobart, 2008), the general lack 
of summative assessment means that citizenship education may well receive 
low priority from both teachers and students, especially when the curriculum 
is overloaded.
Teacher education and training was a further problem identified by the 
Eurydice review. Only six education systems allowed new teachers to special-
ise during their initial teacher training in citizenship education. In addition, a 
further seven trained prospective teachers to become semi-specialists in citizen-
ship education (i.e., to specialise in citizenship education and up to three other 
subjects). In all of these cases, the main content of initial teacher training was 
knowledge of what needs to be taught, the capacity to plan relevant learning 
activities, and the social skills required for engaging with students, parents, peers 
and the local community. Few education systems provided training in the com-
petences that teachers need to evaluate and improve their own teaching practices. 
In addition, it is noteworthy that out of the 36 education systems where all teach-
ers had a formal responsibility for delivering citizenship education because it was 
delivered using a cross-curricular approach, only 13 specified the competences 
that secondary school teachers need to acquire for teaching citizenship education. 
Finally, in the case of continuing professional development for practising teach-
ers, about two-thirds of education systems provided programmes in citizenship 
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education for teachers, although similar programmes for school principals were 
only available in 14 systems.
In short, the Eurydice review implies that citizenship education in Europe is 
less than optimal. Although all countries do have curricula in citizenship educa-
tion, it is clear that several improvements need to be made at the macro level in 
order to boost the effectiveness of citizenship education for promoting young 
people’s civic and political engagement. In particular:
 • Citizenship education should be fully incorporated not just into the second-
ary school curriculum but also the primary school curriculum, with the 
contents of the curriculum being adapted to the educational level of the 
students
 • Student councils at both primary and secondary school levels should be 
made mandatory
 • Opportunities for service learning, voluntary work and extra-curricular 
activities in the community should be expanded considerably, for example, 
in collaboration with community-based organisations, youth organisations 
and other NGOs, and service learning should be made mandatory
 • Summative assessments in citizenship education should be made mandatory
 • Initial teacher training in citizenship education should be made mandatory 
for all prospective teachers
 • Initial teacher training should focus much more directly on the specific ped-
agogies that are known to be effective in promoting youth engagement, and 
on the specific competences that teachers require for reflecting on, evaluat-
ing and improving their own teaching practices
 • Where they are not yet available, continuing professional development 
courses for school principals should be introduced on how to implement 
citizenship education within their schools
The role of the Internet and social media
Another important factor that is highly relevant to youth engagement is, of 
course, digital technology. In one sense, we could have reviewed the research 
that has been conducted into the influence of the Internet and social media on 
youth engagement in Chapter 3, alongside our review of the influence of tra-
ditional mass media. However, because the Internet and social media involve 
technologies that have only been developed very recently, they provide a fasci-
nating opportunity through which to explore how technological developments 
at the macro level impact on patterns of youth engagement. For this reason, we 
have chosen to review the role that is played by digital technology in the current 
chapter on macro factors instead.
Indeed, over the past 20 years, there has been an extraordinary expansion 
both of the range of devices for accessing the Internet and of social media plat-
forms for communicating and interacting with other people. Furthermore, the 
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scale of use by young people today is staggering: one recent UK report estimates 
that 12- to 15-year-olds now spend over 20 hours per week online and send 
over 140 text-based messages per week (Ofcom, 2016). Some have argued that 
young people nowadays are digital natives who, because they have grown up 
immersed in digital technology, relate to this technology in a qualitatively dif-
ferent way from those in older generations who only started to use this technol-
ogy during the course of their adulthood (e.g., Palfrey & Gasser, 2008; Prensky, 
2001); others have argued that the concept of digital natives overstates these 
inter-generational differences (e.g., Kennedy, Judd & Dalgarno, 2010; Jones, 
Ramanau, Cross & Healing, 2010). Whatever the case, the reality is that by the 
time they start school, many children in the developed world have encountered 
a range of technologies, including mobile phones, games consoles, DVD players, 
MP3 players, desktops, laptops and tablets (Plowman, 2011). As a consequence, 
children and young people often have far higher levels of digital expertise than 
older generations, with the Internet being seamlessly integrated into their eve-
ryday lives (Mesch & Talmud, 2010; Thomas, 2011). Digital technology will 
clearly continue to feature within young people’s lives on a significant scale in 
the future, and it is entirely possible that, with the emergence of new devices 
(e.g., Internet-connected watches and glasses), the impact of this technology on 
young people will continue to grow, especially as its cost continues to fall and its 
utilisation increases still further.
The potential of digital technology to transform civic and political engage-
ment was enthusiastically championed in the early days of the Internet (Barlow, 
1996; Hague & Loader, 1999; Loader, 1997). It was argued that the Internet, as 
a globally networked communications system, would allow everyone across the 
world to share information, to communicate with one another, to deliberate 
on political issues and to sidestep the control and authority of the state. It was 
further suggested that youth, who were the most enthusiastic to adopt the new 
technology and use it creatively, would have hugely expanded opportunities for 
undertaking civic and political action through the Internet.
However, research into the uptake and use of the Internet by young people 
during the early part of the new millennium suggested that youth were far more 
interested in using it for interacting and communicating with their friends, man-
aging their social relations, organising their social activities, being entertained 
and staying in touch with current trends in popular culture and celebrity news, 
rather than for enhancing their civic and political understanding or participation 
(Livingstone, Couldry & Markham, 2007; Mesch & Coleman, 2007; Dahlgren & 
Olsson, 2007). These same studies did reveal, however, that in the case of young 
people who were already civically and politically engaged, the Internet did pro-
vide a useful additional tool which they were using to supplement their exist-
ing participatory activities. And there were also some indications that 18- to 
25-year olds were more likely to use the Internet to access political information 
and news than those who were aged 26 and older (Mesch & Coleman, 2007). 
However, during this period, the Internet did not appear to induce or entice 
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other individuals who were not already actively engaged into civic or political 
activity (Livingstone et al., 2007). In addition, offline socio-economic, educa-
tional and gender differences in participation were found to be largely replicated 
online, with digital technology reinforcing rather than overcoming existing ine-
qualities (McLeod, Shah, Hess & Lee, 2010; Mesch & Coleman, 2007).
This rather pessimistic picture of the role of digital technology in enhancing 
youth engagement was dramatically challenged by the events of the Arab Spring. 
These events began in December 2010 and continued through 2011 into 2012, 
and involved political protests on the streets of numerous cities in the Middle 
East and North Africa, including cities in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, 
Iraq and Bahrain (Haseeb, 2012). These protests, which involved large numbers 
of young people, deployed social media on a widespread scale and eventually led 
to significant political changes taking place in some of these countries (Herrera & 
Sakr, 2014). Facebook and Twitter, in particular, were used for organising protests, 
mobilising protestors, communicating the claims and demands being made by the 
protestors and reporting on the progress that was being made. In all of these coun-
tries, the Internet was used to create virtual spaces where the protestors could meet 
and communicate with one another without supervision or interference by the 
government, police or security forces. Furthermore, as the protestors established 
ways in which they could circumvent the official media and operate outside the 
existing political system, they started to devise and develop their own methods 
and spaces for acting as citizen journalists, for documenting and sharing news, for 
exchanging opinions and for crystallising their own views about the political situ-
ation. Interestingly, these online exchanges sometimes led to offline meetings in 
parks or coffee shops where serious and heated discussions would take place which 
nevertheless helped to build trust between the protestors, which contributed fur-
ther to their mobilisation; this was an example of online activism leading directly 
to yet further offline activism in the streets (Herrera & Sakr, 2014; Sakr, 2014).
These findings have been replicated in studies of other mass protests such 
as the Indignados protests in Spain and Greece in 2011, the global Occupy 
protests from 2011 onwards and the Gezi Park protests in Turkey in 2013 
(Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Chrona & Bee, 2017; Gerbaudo, 2012; Juris, 2012; 
Sotiropoulos, 2017). In all of these cases, platforms such as Facebook and Twitter 
have been used to communicate information about the protests, to invite other 
people to participate in the protests, to express solidarity with the protestors 
and to disseminate pictures and videos of the protests. These postings spread 
the messages well beyond the sites of the protests, creating global audiences and 
generating global solidarity. In other words, social media, in the hands of young 
people, have become an extremely powerful tool for mass protest organisation, 
information dissemination, communication and mobilisation.
There is, however, a complementary side to the role of social media in events 
such as these. The very nature of social media means that governments are able to 
develop methods to monitor, surveil and infiltrate the online spaces that are used 
by protestors and activists (Bajoghli, 2014; Tarkowski, Fathy & Melyantsou, 2011). 
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As a consequence, digital technologies and the Internet may not always lead to 
such significant changes to political institutions as they did during the Arab Spring. 
Indeed, traditional power relations may actually be consolidated through digital 
technology, as governments learn how to control and manipulate the virtual spaces 
that are used by protestors and activists for communication.
The Internet and social media can, of course, be used not only for organising 
mass protests on the streets and in city squares and parks but also for a variety of 
other political purposes. As has been noted already, young people below the age of 
25 tend to use the Internet to access political information and news more frequently 
than older individuals (McLeod et al., 2010; Mesch & Coleman, 2007). They are 
also more likely than older people to use online platforms such as YouTube for 
watching political video clips such as speeches and interviews (Bennett, Freelon & 
Wells, 2010; Smith & Rainie, 2008). In addition, some young people themselves 
produce online political satires and parodies and upload them to YouTube or other 
platforms – if these become viral, they reduce the ability of political campaigns to 
manage their own messages (Gueorguieva, 2008). Other political uses of social 
media include joining political groups, receiving information about election can-
didates, and organising political events and meetings – in one study, nearly a third 
of American 18- to 29-year-olds were found to use social media for these kinds of 
political purposes (Smith & Rainie, 2008). Because the Internet and social media 
are so powerful and effective, both democratic and repressive regimes across the 
world that wish to minimise information dissemination and mass mobilisation dur-
ing critical political times have banned or blocked their use within their countries, 
as has occurred, for example, in Egypt, Turkey and China (Howard, Agarwal & 
Hussain, 2011; King, Pan & Roberts, 2013; Roberts, 2016).
Another phenomenon based on digital technology that has been examined is 
that of game playing. Lenhart et al. (2008) found that 97% of American 12- to 
17-year-olds play computer, web, portable or console games. They also found 
that for most of these teenagers, gaming was a social activity, with three-quar-
ters of the respondents playing games with others rather than on their own, at 
least for some of the time. Lenhart et al. analysed the games that were played 
according to whether they provided ‘civic gaming experiences’, that is, experi-
ences that involved simulations of civic actions, helping or guiding other play-
ers, participating in guilds or other groups associated with the game, learning 
about social issues or grappling with ethical issues. It was found that those youth 
that had encountered more of these civic experiences during gaming were also 
more engaged civically and politically. In particular, they were more likely to 
go online to get information about politics and current events, to give or raise 
money for charity, to stay informed about political issues or current events, to 
volunteer, to try to persuade others how to vote in an election, and to participate 
in a protest march or demonstration. In other words, it appeared that digital 
game playing that involved simulations of civic actions had helped to equip these 
teenagers with a wide range of civic and political skills and aptitudes that were 
being applied not just in the online world but in the offline world as well.
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As noted already, in the mid-2000s, the patterns of use of social media for 
political purposes tended to reflect socio-economic, educational and gender dif-
ferences in offline participation (McLeod et al., 2010; Mesch & Coleman, 2007). 
However, more recent research suggests that digital media may now be help-
ing to reduce these inequalities. Indeed, fundamental changes may currently be 
occurring in political practices as youth take greater advantage of social media 
for political purposes. This conclusion emerges particularly clearly from a large-
scale study conducted in the USA by Cohen, Kahne, Bowyer, Middaugh and 
Rogowski (2012; see also Bowyer & Kahne, 2016, and Luttig & Cohen, 2016). 
In 2011, they collected data from nearly 3,000 American youth aged between 15 
and 25 years old, sampling not just white American youth but also black, Latino 
and Asian-American youth. Data were subsequently collected from subsets of the 
same respondents in 2013 and 2015.
Cohen et al. found that, in 2011, contrary to the traditional picture of a digi-
tal divide (i.e., a sharp divide between those who have ready access to digital 
technology and those who do not), 97% of the youth in their study had access to 
the Internet, while 78% used social media to send messages, share status updates 
or chat online at least once per week. The study also examined these youths’ 
engagement in ‘participatory politics’. This was defined as interactive, peer-
based acts through which individuals or groups seek to exert both voice and 
influence on issues of public concern. Examples of such acts include blogging, 
circulating political news, starting a new political group, creating petitions and 
mobilising one’s social network on behalf of a cause. These acts need not occur 
online, although digital media do provide expanded opportunities for them. 
It was found that, in 2011, 41% of the youth had engaged in at least one act of 
participatory politics. Furthermore, participatory politics occurred in addition 
to more conventional forms of political engagement rather than replacing them: 
among young people who engaged in participatory politics, 90% had either 
voted or engaged in some other form of institutionalised politics.
Participatory politics was equitably distributed across the different ethnic groups 
in the study. In addition, it was found that young people from socio-economically 
disadvantaged backgrounds were more likely to get their news from online media 
sources, while those from advantaged backgrounds were more likely to use tra-
ditional news sources instead. Those who obtained their news from more tradi-
tional sources were more likely to vote; by contrast, those who obtained their 
news through online media were more likely to protest business practices. This 
latter trend was most pronounced among the black, Latino and Asian-American 
youth who visited websites created by and for ethnic minority individuals. The 
data collected in 2015 further revealed that the young people who had increased 
their engagement in participatory politics the most between 2013 and 2015 were 
the ones who used social media for political purposes the most, and these were the 
minority groups and those who had the fewest socio-economic resources (Luttig & 
Cohen, 2016). In short, social media appeared to be mobilising young people for 
specific types of political activity, especially the most disadvantaged young people.
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The same study also provided some clues about how social media were exert-
ing this effect. In the survey, Cohen et al. asked their respondents about two 
distinct forms of online activity: friendship-driven activity and interest-driven 
activity. In the former, an individual uses social media for interacting with friends 
and family members (e.g., by posting status updates or tagging photos); in the 
latter, individuals engage online with their interests (e.g., by visiting websites 
about music, sports, fashion, etc. and communicating online with others who 
share those same interests). The survey found that 50% of young people engaged 
in friendship-driven activity every day, while 25% engaged in interest-driven 
activity every day. Bowyer and Kahne (2016) then examined how these two 
types of activity related to voting, offline political action and online political 
action. They found that friendship-driven activity in 2013 led to more online 
political activity in 2015. By contrast, interest-driven activity in 2013 led to 
more offline political activity in 2015 – those who participated in interest-driven 
activity in 2013 were more likely to have had someone online ask them to par-
ticipate in politics, and those who had been asked to participate were then more 
likely to vote in the US elections that took place in 2014.
Despite these encouraging findings, there is still a debate about the value of 
digital acts of civic and political participation. Some authors (e.g., Gladwell, 
2010; Morozov, 2011) have argued that online participation only fosters low-
cost, low-risk and low-impact activism – so-called ‘slacktivism’ or ‘clicktiv-
ism’ – which requires very little effort or cost, has little effect in the real world 
and lacks serious motivation but makes the person feel that they have engaged 
and made a contribution. Examples of such action include ‘liking’ or sharing 
political content on Facebook, signing online petitions, joining online organi-
sations but without making any significant contribution to their activities, and 
using a slogan or avatar as a profile picture. The criticism is that such activi-
ties are not only ineffective in bringing about meaningful change but actually 
make individuals less likely to engage in other forms of civic and political 
activism that would be more effective. As we have seen, this last contention 
is probably incorrect. Bowyer and Kahne’s (2016) findings contradict it, as do 
the findings of a study by Ogilvy PR and Georgetown University’s Center for 
Social Impact Communication (2011): the latter found that those who support 
causes most often through social media (e.g., by joining a group dedicated to a 
cause on Facebook, blogging about a cause, or posting an icon on a social pro-
file) in fact participate in more than twice as many civic and political activities 
(both online and offline) compared to people who do not use social media in 
this way.
Other criticisms that have been made of activism through social media 
are that:
 • It encourages the oversimplification of complex issues
 • It can lead to the uncritical acceptance of fake news and the insufficient vet-
ting of information
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 • It encourages the ghettoization of discourse and the creation of ‘echo cham-
bers’ or ‘filter bubbles’, with people only receiving information online that 
is consistent with their pre-existing beliefs
 • The anonymity that can be used online makes it easy to insult, offend and 
even threaten other people
In the case of mass protests organised through social media, several additional 
criticisms have been made (see Tarkowski et al., 2011; Passini, 2012; and Kahne, 
Middaugh & Allen, 2014, for useful discussions of these). For example, it has 
been argued that:
 • Such actions may be poorly coordinated due to the lack of formal organisers 
and leaders
 • The lack of a traditional organisational hierarchy may also mean that there 
is little control of the forms of protest that are used and few constraints to 
prevent the hijacking of the protest by other groups
 • Communications through social media rarely facilitate dialogue and the 
expression of minority ideas that do not conform to group norms, which 
can generate a false consensus
 • Communications through social media do not adequately support meaning-
ful negotiation and deliberation
 • Social media communications may generate participation by people who 
have low motivation or commitment to the cause and who only have weak 
social links to other protestors
On the other hand, it is becoming increasingly clear that using social media does 
have many positive benefits for civic and political engagement (Kahne et al., 
2014; Passini, 2012). These include:
 • The speed of information dissemination
 • The low financial costs that are incurred in communicating with large num-
bers of people
 • Flexibility in the practical coordination of events such as flash-mobs and 
protests
 • The potential for pluralism of information about issues and concerns, espe-
cially information that public authorities might be withholding, and for 
challenging the information monopoly of repressive governments
 • Overcoming geographical distance and national borders in the dissemina-
tion of information and eyewitness accounts of protests and building global 
solidarity
 • Obtaining external financial support
Given the rapid evolution of digital devices and social media platforms, one con-
clusion is certain: the creative ways in which young people use digital technology 
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will continue to develop in the future. And studies into young people’s use of 
such technology in the pursuit of civic and political goals will no doubt continue 
to preoccupy social science researchers for many years to come.
The role of politicians and political parties
The final macro factor to be considered here is the role that politicians and politi-
cal parties can play in mobilising youth. It has been known for many years that 
mobilisation by other people, especially politicians and political parties, is associ-
ated with people’s levels of political activity. The same applies in the case of civic 
activity. Thus, being contacted and invited personally to vote or to participate 
in a political or civic process is a powerful predictor of subsequent participa-
tion (Green & Gerber, 2004; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Zukin et al., 2006). 
However, all too often, youth feel ignored by politicians and believe that their 
concerns and interests are regarded as being irrelevant, unimportant and trivial 
by those in power or by those seeking power. Under such circumstances, it is 
perhaps not surprising that youth disengage from participating in conventional 
political activity.
This finding emerged especially clearly from focus groups that were con-
ducted by PIDOP with both national majority and ethnic minority 16- to 
26-year-olds in nine European countries (Barrett, 2012; Barrett & Zani, 2015b; 
see Table 1.2 in Chapter 1 for a list of the ethnic groups and countries involved). 
It was clear from the discussions that took place in these focus groups that most 
youth in these countries felt that politicians were not interested in their issues 
and concerns. In addition, many young people said that they did not bother to 
participate in civic and political matters because they distrusted politicians, who 
they viewed as cynically pursuing their own goals and interests, rarely keeping 
their promises to the electorate. Some youth also believed that many politicians 
employed stereotypes when thinking about youth and regarded youth as being so 
politically disengaged and alienated that it was not worth the effort of trying to 
engage with them; in response, the politicians themselves were then disregarded 
and ignored by the youth.
It is notable that when politicians do make significant efforts to engage actively 
with youth, then youth respond. There have been two occasions in the past 
decade when this strategy has been employed to good effect by politicians: by 
Barack Obama in 2008 in the USA, and by Jeremy Corbyn in 2017 in the UK.
In 2008, in addition to the traditional substantial advertising on television, the 
Obama campaign used social media to target youth on a significant scale, set-
ting up blogging communities and Twitter feeds and distributing regular emails 
containing video clips that exhorted recipients to get involved by recruiting 
friends, organising campaign events and donating money (Bennett et al., 2010). 
Young voters were more likely to be contacted by the Obama campaign than by 
the opposing McCain campaign – 25% of voters aged 18–29 years old reported 
being contacted either in person or by phone on behalf of the Obama campaign, 
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whereas only 13% reported being contacted by the opposing McCain campaign. 
The disparity was even larger in some of the key battleground states, where more 
than half of the voters under the age of 30 said that they had been contacted 
by the Obama campaign (54% in Pennsylvania and 61% in Nevada) (Keeter, 
Horowitz & Tyson, 2008). Another notable feature of the campaign was the 
creative production of unofficial online videos by Obama supporters (rather than 
by his official campaign), some of which went viral and attracted many millions 
of views. The campaign was extraordinarily successful, with voting among 18- 
to 29-year-olds up to 53%, which was an increase of 4–5% on the 2004 election 
and 11% on the 2000 election. Furthermore, exit polls suggested that 70% of 
those aged under 30 had voted for Obama.
In the case of the 2017 general election in the UK, the Labour Party also 
deliberately targeted youth voters (Hobbs, 2017; Therrien, 2017). Social media 
were used to distribute advertisements with positive messages, which empha-
sised that the party was building a social movement for progressive change. In 
addition, Momentum – a Labour Party subgroup supporting Corbyn – created 
videos, many of which were parodies, as well as quirky entertaining posts, which 
were widely ‘liked’ and shared on social media, and some of which went viral. 
Momentum also mobilised young people into an army of canvassers, and set up 
a website that enabled activists to coordinate their canvassing activities in mar-
ginal seats. This led to young people who had no previous experience of can-
vassing to team up with more experienced canvassers. In addition, the Labour 
manifesto specifically targeted young people in its policy proposals (e.g., with 
a promise to abolish university tuition fees, reintroduce student maintenance 
grants, abolish zero-hours contracts and increase the minimum wage). Corbyn, 
with his emphasis on justice, fairness and human rights, was also endorsed by 
many anti-establishment celebrities and musicians, including from the world of 
grime (a UK music genre), which further bolstered Corbyn’s youth credentials. 
He also undertook interviews with youth music magazines and with a YouTube 
football channel, again specifically targeting youth audiences. The strategy had 
significant effects: the result of the election, in which the Conservatives had 
been expected to win a large increased majority, was a hung parliament, with 
Labour gaining 31 seats and the Conservatives losing 12 seats. Labour’s share of 
the youth vote increased significantly from the 2015 general election (Prosser, 
Fieldhouse, Green, Mellon & Evans, 2018). Among first-time voters (i.e., those 
aged 18 and 19 years), Labour was 47% ahead of the Conservatives, whereas 
among voters aged 70 or older, the Conservatives were ahead by 50% (YouGov, 
2017). Perhaps most tellingly of all, the average age at which a voter was more 
likely to have voted Conservative rather than Labour was 47 years, an increase 
from 34 years at the start of the election campaign (YouGov, 2017). That said, 
there is also evidence that turnout among those aged 18–24 years did not increase 
on the scale that some newspapers and pundits claimed at the time, with the most 
significant increases in voter turnout actually being among those aged 25–44 
years (Prosser et al., 2018).
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Both the Obama campaign and the Corbyn campaign indicate that, when 
politicians and political parties pay attention to young people’s views on civic and 
political matters, propose policies that address their concerns and use methods 
to communicate which youth themselves use to communicate with each other, 
then young people are more likely to support those politicians and parties. In 
other words, if politicians and political parties wish to gain support from young 
people, then they need to engage more actively with youth through relevant 
media, they need to treat their views and concerns with greater respect, and 
they need to propose policies that address the needs of young people. This is 
perhaps not a surprising conclusion, but it is one which politicians and political 
institutions should heed if they wish to enhance levels of youth engagement with 
conventional political processes.
Conclusions
This chapter has reviewed a wide range of macro factors that can influence youth 
civic and political engagement. These factors include: the patterns of political 
and civic engagement that are exhibited by adults within a country; the recent 
history and longevity of democracy within a country; the level of economic, 
educational and health development of a country; the extent to which human 
rights, the rule of law and government accountability apply within a country; 
national policies on migrant integration and naturalisation; national, regional or 
local policies on youth engagement; voting age; the provision of youth organisa-
tions within a country; the availability of a youth parliament within a country; 
the extent to which education policies and regulations foster the provision of 
effective citizenship education; the availability of digital technology and social 
media; and the extent to which politicians and political parties attempt to engage 
with and mobilise youth.
This review of the existing research into macro factors suggests that rather 
less research has been conducted into the relationship of macro factors to youth 
engagement than has been conducted into psychological, social and demographic 
factors, and much more research is required to enable us to properly understand 
how macro factors affect young people’s engagement. Such research would bene-
fit considerably from interdisciplinary collaboration involving political scientists, 
sociologists, policy analysts, educationalists and psychologists. As we noted ear-
lier in this chapter, it is unlikely that many macro factors operate independently 
of social and demographic factors – it is instead much more likely that macro, 
demographic, social and psychological factors are intertwined in complex causal 
pathways, pathways that have not yet been properly investigated in any great 
depth to date. For this reason, interdisciplinary teams of social scientists would 
be ideal for undertaking investigations of these causal pathways involving mul-
tiple levels of factors.
In addition, a great deal of further research is required into the impact of the 
policy environment on youth civic and political engagement. As we have seen 
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in the case of policies on migrant integration, these can have significant effects 
on the civic and political activity of migrant youth by either facilitating or hin-
dering their school education, and their participation in local communities and 
in conventional politics. In the case of educational policies, these too can either 
encourage and support youth in becoming active citizens (by providing them 
with suitable educational experiences to promote their civic and political knowl-
edge and skills) or limit their capacities to engage civically and politically (by 
denying them these experiences). Likewise, youth policies can also either support 
youth engagement (by specifying high expectations of youth as active citizens 
and providing plentiful resources for youth organisations so that they can help to 
equip young people with the relevant skills and experience needed for meeting 
those expectations) or hinder their engagement (by having limited expectations 
of youth and withholding the necessary resources from youth organisations). 
However, even when very well-intentioned policies are in place, there can still 
be a significant gap between those policies and their actual implementation on 
the ground, as well as a further gap between the measures that are implemented 
and the perceptions of those measures by young people themselves. There is cur-
rently very little research into these various issues, and further investigations are 
required to understand the causal links that can exist between policies and youth 
engagement, the mediating role that young people’s perceptions of policies can 
play in the process and the policy implementation gaps that can arise.
In addition, much more research is needed into the effects of youth parlia-
ments, both on the youth who participate in them and on the youth who are 
excluded from them. There is a notable lack of research into (as opposed to offi-
cial rhetoric about) the extent to which youth parliaments serve to enhance the 
civic and political skills of those who participate in youth parliaments, and into 
the attitudes and subsequent behaviours of those who are excluded from these 
parliaments. There is also a need to identify ways in which these parliaments can 
be made much more inclusive, rather than being populated by youth who are 
socio-economically and educationally advantaged, and ways to ensure that youth 
do not view these parliaments as being politically ineffective and irrelevant.
The role of the Internet and social media in youth civic and political engage-
ment is another area that is in need of further investigation. Studies are required 
to monitor the changes that occur to youth engagement as digital technology 
continues to develop. Digital devices and social media platforms are rapidly 
evolving, and youth engagement will almost certainly continue to change in 
conjunction with this evolution. Studies using longitudinal and cohort sequential 
designs could be invaluable for understanding how digital technology impacts on 
the civic and political engagement of young people.
Finally, our review of the literature raises a crucial question about responsibil-
ity for the civic and political education of young people: whether this respon-
sibility should lie with the state or with civil society or whether it should be a 
private or family matter. Because the research reveals that the state, civil society 
and the family can all be influential agents for fostering the civic and political 
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engagement of young people, there is a question about whether all three should 
share this responsibility equally or whether one or two of these agents should 
take the primary responsibility. The answer to this question will presumably 
vary depending on the cultural and ideological orientation of the person provid-
ing the answer. There are important political-normative issues here which would 
benefit from the attention of political theorists.
This chapter concludes our survey of the different levels of factors that are 
related to youth civic and political engagement. We have now seen that many 
different psychological, social, demographic and macro factors are linked to 
youth engagement. In the next chapter, we will integrate some of the main 
conclusions that have emerged from our survey and provide a more theoretical 
perspective. We will also summarise some of the actions that may be taken to 
promote youth civic and political engagement, drawing together the various 
lines of evidence that have been reviewed. In addition, we will describe a major 
policy initiative that is currently under way in Europe which is aimed at enhanc-
ing young people’s levels of democratic engagement and participation through 
the harnessing of state education systems.
